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STuDENT NoTEs
CnimES-HOmiCIDE IN DEFENSE OF PERSONAL PRoPEnTY.-Defendant
shot and killed one man and mortally wounded another while they
were robbing his chicken roost. The wounded man cried out after
the first shot and asked the defendant not to shoot again. The defendant shot four more times stating that he "was expecting a shot" and
felt in danger. The two thieves had placed chickens to the value of
three dollars in a sack which made their act a statutory felony. Upon
the jury failing to reach a verdict the commonwealth appealed and
asked the court of appeals for a certifidation of the law. The following
rule of law was laid down: "One believing, or having reasonable
grounds to believe, that a trespass of. felony not having the element
of force, violence, atrocity, or the invasion of the home, was being,
or was about to be committed, may use such force as is necessary, or as
may appear to him acting in good faith and upon reasonable grounds
to be necessary to protect his property short of killing or inflicting
great bodily harm." Commonwealth v. Beverly, 237 Ky. 35, 34 S. W.
(2nd) 941 (1931). The rule set forth in this case is in accord with
former Kentucky decisions which have held that homicide in defense
of personal property is not justifiable. Chapman v. Commonwealth,
12 Ky. L. R. 704, 15 S. W. 50 (1891); Flynn v. Commonwealth, 204 Ky.
572, 264 S. W. 1111 (1924); Stacey v. Commonwealth, 189 Ky. 402, 225
S. W. 37 (1920); Grigsby v. Commonwealth, 151 Ky. 496, 152 S. W. 580
(1913). The Kentucky rule lines up with the majority rule which is
based on the theory that the taking of life in the protection of personal
property is too great a resistence of sucb a wrong. Taking of life to
obtain money wrongfully taken from the owner is not justifiable.
Oldacre v. State, 196 Ala. 690, 72 So. 303 (1916). Killing another caught
stealing corn from a crib is without excuse. Bloom v. State, 155 Ind.
292, 58 N. E. 81 (1900).
Killing in defense of personal property and
not in the prevention of a felony committed by violence or suprise is
not warranted in law. State v. Blanc, 64 Wash. 122, 116 Pac. 660
(1911); Brown v. State, 149 Ark. 588, 233 S. W. 762 (1921); Diggers v.
U. S., 104 S. W. 1169, 7 Indian Territory - (1907)
Blackstone said in IV Commentaries 181, that the right to kill in
prevention of crimes was limited to those crimes which, if committed,
would be punishable by death. This was a recognition of the rule that
the taking of life was too great a redress of a minor injury. The
theory underlying this rule is manifest in the law today, but the
justification of homicide today is not the fact that the crime committed
Is a capital offense but that it is in the protection of person, or home,
or in prevention of felonies in which violence is a constituent part.
Stacey v. Commonwealth, supra. One may resist the taking or destruction of one's personal property to any extent short of taking life or
Inflicting great bodily harm. Life is too valuable to be sacrificed
solely for the protection of property, and one taking life for such a
reason in the absence of force or violence by the wrongdoer manifests
such a culpable recklessness in regard to humanity and such a wanton
disregard of social duty that he assumes the risk of placing himself
in the position of a willful murderer.
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The application of the rule is often difficult. Of course, where the
homicide is committed solely in defense of personal property it Is
absolutely unjustifiable, and the state can apply the rule without
being forced to weaken the case for the prosecution by giving instructions on self-defense.
In such cases the application of the rule is
simple, and speedy justice prevails. For example: In Grigsby V.
Commonwealth, supra., defendant killed a man to prevent him from
taking his whiskey. Defendant asked for instructions on self-defense.
The court held that as there was no evidence that he was in danger
of death or great bodily harm he was not entitled to such Instructions.
However, in cases where the defense of personal property Is connected
with other facts, such as a forcible resistance by the wrongdoer of the
owner's attempt to protect his property, the case confronting the state
is not so simple. This is very well illustrated In Commonwealth v.
Beverly, supra. In that case the defendant stated that the reason he
fired after being requested to desist was because of the fact that from
the circumstances of the case and that thieves usually go armed he
felt in danger and expected a shot. The court Instructed that if the
defendant had reasonable grounds to believe and in good faith did
believe that it was necessary to kill in order to save himself from
death or great bodily harm his act was justifiable on the grounds of
self-defense or apparent necessity. Under the same or similar circumstances a jury might find that apparent necessity to kill existed,
when, in fact, the defendant knew his life was not in danger. For the
above reasons it is readily seen that homicide in self-defense, while
having no connection whatever with homicide in defense of personal
property, often provides loopholes for one to kill solely in defense of
personal property and escape punishment on the grounds of necessary
or apparently, necessary self-defense.
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CRIES-ENTRAPpENT.-The county sheriff had reasonable grounds
to believe that the appellant was engaged in the illicit traffic In intoxicating liquors. The sheriff employed X, an experienced undercover
man In the federal prohibition service, to Investigate the matter. X
presented himself to the appellant as a bootlegger and made an agreement to purchase liquor at a stipulated price to be delivered at a
designated place. The appellant was arrested by X in the process of
delivering the liquor. It was held that the plea of entrapment was
not a good defense in this case. State v. Ragan, 288 Pac. 218 (1930).
In the principal case the investigating party had reasonable grounds
for suspecting the accused, the accused had In fact made many previous
sales, and X did nothing towards manufacturing the crime. It is
practically the universal rule that under such circumstances there Is
no entrapment. The principal case represents an almost iron-clad case
under the general and federal rules on entrapment-"Where a criminal
is dectected by means of a trap set for him, entrapment is no defense
unless It appears that he was actually persuaded and induced to

